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Abstract 
Has macroeconomic management succeeded in making privatization promote growth in Africa? What are 
the probable strategies that should accompany the privatization reform process to promote growth in 
Africa? To what extent has the privatization process succeeded in attracting foreign direct investment to 
Africa? The study investigates the relationship between macroeconomic management and privatization. 
Many African countries have embarked on one form of privatization reform or the other since 1980 as one 
of the stringent conditions for accessing capital from the IMF and the World Bank. Secondly globalization 
and the gradually integration of the African economy into the global economy also means that Africa has to 
strategically develop its domestic market to cushion itself from fluctuations and probable contagion 
associated with global economic crisis that are always inevitable Stiglitz (2000) and Ojeaga P. (2012). The 
methods of estimation used are the OLS, linear mixed effects (LME), 2SLS and the GMM method of 
estimation. It was found that macroeconomic management has the capacity to affect the success of the 
privatization reform process. It was also found that privatization was not promoting growth in Africa; 
privatization could promote growth if long run growth strategies are implemented together with the 
privatization reform process. Privatization was also found not to have the capacity to attract foreign 
investment to many African countries. 
Keywords: Africa, Political Economy, Game Theory, Macroeconomic Management and Privatization,  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
In this section we introduce the topic under discussion. There is currently a strong and 
heated argument that privatization has not been very successful in many parts of Africa. 
There is also evidence that institutions can have strong effects for growth in many 
developing and emerging economics Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and Robinson J. (2001). 
The quest for growth is also one of the major factors that led to the implementation of 
privatization reforms in many African countries Easterly (2001). 
 
Privatization is the process of reallocation of assets from the public to the privates sector 
for better management and to improve efficiency of firms, making privatization to be a 
way of improving a nation’s economy and searching for elusive growth Mankiw (2001). 
Soto (1996), states that free market economies are a way of enshrining property rights 
and leads to massive exchange of low cost goods thereby fostering specialization and 
greater productivity, privatization itself is based on the concepts of free markets. 
 
According to Poole (1996), between 1984 and 1996 there has been a total transfer of 
about 468 billion dollars in assets from the public to the private sector worldwide. A 
major contributing factor to the increase in privatization is also the fall of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Privatization has also spread to other 
countries such as Japan and Mexico in Asia and Latin America, who have privatized a 
sizeable amount of government owned enterprises Meggisson, Nash and Radenbourgh 
(1996). 
 
Macroeconomic management can also have strong effects on growth Stiglitz (2000)1. 
There exist different facets of macroeconomic management which can include the fiscal, 
monetary, trade and institutional factors that are intertwined to define the macroeconomic 
management process. This paper investigates if there is a relationship between 
privatization and macroeconomic management. A host of macroeconomic variables could 
in fact pose a challenge to a successful privatization reform process such as the 
institutional quality which can affect the business environment, country specific 
attractiveness for commerce, the riskiness of the business environment which is 
determined by country specific monetary policy and finally issues of property rights, 
legal redress and ownership. 
 
Stiglitz (2000) discusses extensively that globalization (economic liberalization) takes 
place in stages beginning with financial sector reforms, market liberalization and 
privatization and finally institutional reforms. This paper studies the effect of some 
macro-economic variables on privatization in Africa, using some selected 10 African 
countries Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Kenya, Uganda, South 
Africa and Botswana for a period of 53 years (1960 to 2012) although some years of data 
are missing. The method of estimation used are the OLS, mixed effect linear regression, 
two stage least squares and the general method of moment (GMM). The last two are 
relied on due to the endogeneity of the institutional variable. The rest of the paper is 
divided into the scope and objective of the study, stylized facts on privatization and 
                                               
1 The seminar paper by Stiglitz (2000) “Whither Reform” points out that privatization without institutional 
reform drives corruption and makes macroeconomic management ineffective. 
macroeconomic management, review of literature, theory and methodology, data and 
sources, results and finally the concluding sections.  
 
1.1Scope and Objective of Study 
 
 
In this section we present the scope and objectives of the study. The study presents 
insights on how some macroeconomic factors affect the privatization reform process, 
thereby studying the relationship between privatization and macroeconomic management 
in some selected African countries. The objectives of the study are a.) To examine which 
macroeconomic variables affect the privatization process in Africa? b.) To determine if 
the privatization process has succeeded in promoting growth? c.) To ascertain if 
privatization has attracted foreign direct investment to the continent? The study will 
provide useful evidence for policy makers who to evaluate the impact of macroeconomic 
management on the privatization process and growth. 
 
 
1.2 Stylized Facts on Privatization and Macroeconomic 
Management 
 
 
Trends show that openness has not experienced significant increases in Africa. While 
minimal increases were recorded in the 1980s the degree of openness has not managed to 
return to the pre 1990 period.  
 
There are also increases in government expenditure spending depicting that government 
were probably spending more on infrastructural provision or consumption in countries. 
Inflation is also on the high side with an average of 5 percent among countries. 
 Flow of credit to the private sector our measure of privatization is on the decrease for 
North, West and Central Africa with East and Southern Africa experiencing relative 
increases in credit flow. The implication of this is that the privatization process has not 
yielded sufficient results since the private sector still finds it difficult to access credit, 
thereby depicting the riskiness of the African business environment, Ojeaga, Odejimi and 
Ojeaga (2013). 
 
Fig. 1 
 
Note: The above trends depict openness for the ten African countries in our sample Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana. Openness is the ratio of exports to 
imports in the ten countries. 
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Another implication for private sector businesses is that loan accumulation will be low, 
depicting that business were probably averse to borrowing and could affect the overall 
privatization process since firms are likely to migrate to more business friendly regions. 
Fig. 2 
 
Note: The above trends depict openness for the ten African countries in our sample Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana. Government expenditure 
spending is the aggregate expenditure of government in years in constant USD.  
 
 
Banks were also failing in their primary responsibility of lending to private sector 
business, interest rates are high and this has strong consequences for firms since it has a 
reducing effect on their profit margins, preventing firms from borrowing. 
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Fig. 3 
 
 
Note: The above trends depict openness for the ten African countries in our sample Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana. Inflation is the increment in 
average prices over time in percentage. 
 
 
Africa lags behind in property rights protection, institutional weaknesses also plagues 
many African economies making it to be less attractive for foreign business and 
presenting enormous entry barriers despite the abundance of natural resource and low 
cost of labour which could attract trade to many African countries. 
 
Poor oversight function is also another challenge with incidences of judicial weaknesses, 
extrajudicial malpractices and high level of corruption in government which often affects 
investor’s perception. 
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Fig. 4 
 
Note: The above trends depict openness for the ten African countries in our sample Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana. Direct credit to the private sector 
is all credit granted to the private sector in constant USD. 
 
 
 
Improved institutions could have strong effects on trade, returns on investment and could 
stimulate local entrepreneurship in many African economies Stiglitz (2000). Poverty 
reduction is another likely advantage that the strengthening of institutions could achieve. 
 
Inequality could be reduced to the barest minimum if government strengthens existing 
institutions and provide basic social infrastructural services. Skill could be improved 
considerably, through better education curriculums and access to proper and useful 
education that can provide employable manpower in many African countries. 
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
1960 1980 2000 2020 1960 1980 2000 2020
1960 1980 2000 2020 1960 1980 2000 2020
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10
dcps dcps
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
Years
Graphs by id
Privatization Trends
Fig. 5 
 
Note: The above trends depict openness for the ten African countries in our sample Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana. GDP is the total goods and 
services produced in countries in constant USD. 
 
 
 
GDP is also on the increase with strong increases noticeable between 2000 till date. This 
is attributable to sustained high prices of global commodities otherwise known as the 
commodity boom, which is currently driving growth in many African economies. 
 
Net FDI appears to be positive depicting that Africa was managing to attract FDI despite 
the hostile nature of its business environment. The nature of such investment are likely to 
be in the natural resources sector although services such the telecommunications sector is 
also attracting huge investments. 
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Fig. 6 
 
Note: The above trends depict openness for the ten African countries in our sample Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana. FDI is the aggregate foreign 
direct investment inflow in constant USD. 
 
 
1.3 Review of Literature 
 
 
In this section we review past and current literature relevant to the topic under study. 
According to Cook and Uchida (2003)2, there are numerous reasons why countries might 
want to embark on the privatization process, one of the chief concerns are those of cost 
efficiency and curbing wastages. State ownership of assets also crowds out investment 
from the private sector.  Others however argue that the normative view that privatization 
was going to curb wastage were in fact not the only reasons for instituting privatization 
reforms, stating that privatization is likely to lead to public welfare maximization. 
                                               
2 See also Harsch (2000) and Konai (2000) for further discussion on how privatization curbs wastages. 
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World Bank Report (2002), points out that privatization has the capability to attract 
foreign direct investment to countries. Sachs (1992)3 also expresses fears regarding the 
expected gains of privatization stating that privatization is often urgent and politically 
vulnerable. This is particularly true since most privatization reforms are often carried out 
during national economic downturn. Neoliberals argue that price and trade liberalization 
coupled with privatization and macroeconomic stabilization is significant in the economic 
restructuring process and has the capability of driving growth in Africa and achieving 
convergence with the west Sachs (1994). 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report 
1999 reiterate that private ownership has the capability of ensuring profit-oriented 
corporate governance. Trade and price liberalization on the other hand could create an 
environment of competition that attracts gains from profitable activities. 
 
Privatization reforms are often carried out after a period of failure to achieve the quest for 
growth. As pointed out by Lipton and Sachs (1990), Blanchard et al (1991) and Frydman, 
Rapaczyski and Turkowitz (1997) the fall of communism offered a window for the 
implementation of privatization reforms particularly in Eastern Europe. With economic 
problems in Eastern Europe and parts of Africa in the 1980s the need for the rapid 
privatization of public enterprises posed strong challenges for economists and policy 
makers Hamm, King and Stuckler (2012). While economists have understood how to 
liberalize and stabilize economies, the idea of privatization of an entire economy was 
quite new. 
                                               
3 See Sachs (1992) for further discussion regarding the uncertainty surrounding privatization outcomes. 
Ellerman (2003) reviewed the effect of foreign capital, on the privatization process for 
Russian and other parts of eastern Europe and found that foreign capital were often 
rejected by social elites due to issues of economic nationalism. Foreign investors were 
also found not to be willing to pay vast sums for obsolete Soviet firms. Suggesting that 
employee share ownership, were another quick method of privatization which could 
concentrate ownership in the hands individual employee and prevent cases of hostile 
takeover. 
 
Burawoy (1996) and Hamm, King and Stuckler (2012), after studying Chinas trajectory 
to growth also state that privatization reforms should be implemented with caution. They 
insist that privatization might lead to asset stripping rather than investment warning that 
such predatory investment might harm growth. 
 
Nellis (2008) argues that even though privatization reforms are more beneficial in 
countries with good legal framework and secured property rights, World international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF termed “shock therapists” are 
often of the view that nations are often better off with a flawed privatization than delayed 
divestiture. 
 
Ashlund (2002) argues extensively that despite the failure of privatization no economy 
has been known to suffer from “too radical reforms” allowing us to conclude that 
privatization could drive growth even though the effects are not likely to be immediate. 
Other studies such Bennet et al (2004: 2007) also conclude that privatization is beneficial 
to growth offering support for this using econometric analyses. For full review of the 
privatization literature see Burawoy (1996) and Hamm, King and Stuckler (2012) for 
further discussion.  
 
 
2.0 Theory and Methodological Review 
 
 
In this section we present the theory on privatization and the methodology for the study. 
We present the privatization reform process as a two person game i.e. the principal agent 
contract with agency problems. Privatization will be successful in cases where there are 
no predatory takeovers of public enterprises. Investors will always cater to their own 
interest except some regulatory a framework was set in place; making the public welfare 
maximization needs of the privatization process to be unattainable and growth to be 
elusive in the absence of some regulatory measure. 
 
The privatization process effectively can now be viewed as a contract between public 
firms (in most cases owned by government the owner of the public assets to be divested 
from) and potential investors. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) point out four basic principles 
contract design, they include informativeness principle which is based on the premise that 
performance is based on the effort exerted by the agent, incentive intensity principle 
which is based on four factors which include profits increments, precision in carrying out 
desired activities, agents risk tolerance and agent reaction to incentives see also 
Holmstrom (1979). The monitoring intensity principle which states that optimal incentive 
will correspond to optimal monitoring see also Prendergast (1999) and finally the equal 
compensation principle which is based on the condition that activities valued by the 
principal should be equally valuable to the agent. 
 
To analyze the privatization issue we present a simple normal form game to capture 
principal agency problems under the assumption that the privatization process now 
becomes contract that is written in a World of asymmetric information, uncertainty and 
risk. 
 Table 1. A Simple Privatization Normal Form Game 
 State 1 
Investors (Invest)  
State 2 
Investors (Do not invest) 
Condition A 
Government (Monitors) 
Welfare Maximized for both parties 
(Returns gained for both government 
and investors) Improves Competition 
(Payoff A1) (1,1)- Nash Equilibrium 
(Minimum benefit for Government) 
Government continues to manage 
obtaining low returns due to little 
competition. (Payoff 2) (1.0) 
Condition B 
Government (Does not monitors) 
(Welfare Maximized for investors) 
Returns for only Investors. 
(Payoff B1) (0,1) 
Welfare not maximized for both 
parties (Government continues to 
lose). (Payoff B2) (0,0) 
 
Note: The table above presents the privatization process strategy in the presence of adequate oversight 
(monitoring) and no oversight (absence of monitoring) as a normal form game to capture privatization as a 
contract written in a World of asymmetric information, uncertainty and risk. 
 
The outcome will result in different payoffs for both parties concerned. Under  condition 
A that government monitors, if investors will invest will depend on a host of factors such 
as property rights laws as depicted by degree of openness to trade, quality of institutions, 
business environment riskiness as reflected by inflation and price fluctuations, market 
potential, and government fiscal policies. All things being equal if investors invest the 
welfare of the investors and that of the public government will be maximized and growth 
will be attained. If investors fail to invest under Condition A, government continues to 
manage public enterprises however gains will be low owing to poor competitive 
environments.  
 
Under Condition B in which there is no government monitoring there will be a case of 
high risks associated with investment, if investors invest, here the welfare of the investor 
will be maximized since investors will engage in predatory investment and take 
advantage of the market to the detriment of the public welfare here growth will not be 
attained.  
If investors fail to invest and the institutional and legal framework for oversights which is 
the measure of monitoring are not in place public firms will continue to incur losses, as a 
result of rent seeking public officials. In stating the model we assume the case of 
condition B, to be reminiscent of the privatization process in many parts of Africa with 
poor legal framework and institutional deficiencies. Based on these we state the 
following; 
a.) Privatization will only drive growth in economies where there are strong legal 
frameworks and after effective institutional reforms. 
b.) Predatory investment is likely to reduce the potential gains from the privatization 
process. 
c.) Risky business environment might prevent the privatization reform process from 
attracting investment in Africa. 
d.) Incentives for investors might be strategic in attracting investment and making the 
privatization program successful. 
 
In identifying the model we begin by describing the factors that will inform our analysis. 
If privatization begins to take effect, businesses will experiences changes in the 
immediate business environment influenced by the privatization reform process allowing 
us to state that direct capital to the private sector (DCPS) will be a function of the 
business environment (BUSENV) and the privatization reform process (PRIVREF). 
 
(1.)            DCPS=BUSENV + PRIVREF 
The effect of macroeconomic management (MEM) will also be described as a function of 
three major macroeconomic variables for the purpose of the study, which include a 
measure of the riskiness of the immediate business environment represented by inflation 
trends (INF) which captures the monetary policy effectiveness, openness to trade (OPEN) 
which will depict country specific trade policy and exchange rate (EXCRATE) which 
depicts how a country macroeconomic policy will respond to fluctuation in the global 
market which are likely to have a back effect on its trade balance sheet. 
 
(2.)           MEM= INF+ OPEN+ EXCRATE 
Institutions (INST) will also be a function of oversight regulatory framework 
(OVERSIGHT) since handing off businesses; will allow government to focus on its 
responsibility of regulation and enforcement (LEGALFRW), which will be a function of 
judicial efficiency. Institutions in Africa are known to be weak in general; its efficiency 
ineffectiveness is in most cases not in carrying out its regulatory activities but in 
effectively enforcing the law. 
 
(3.)           INST= OVERSIGHT+ LEGALFRW 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) will also be influenced by country specific market 
potential (MARPOT) such as resource presence, strong domestic market such as in China 
and India and the transaction cost (TRCOST) in investment destination countries. 
 
(4.)           FDIINFLOW=MARPOT +TRCOST 
Privatization itself will be a function country specific macroeconomic policy (MEM) 
which will be particularly true since countries who want to privatize will have to make 
reasonable macroeconomic policy adjustments before the privatization reform process 
and transaction cost (TRCOST) which will inform investors opinion and be a likely 
motivation for investors to invest in countries other than theirs due to relative low taxes, 
cheap labour and overall cost of production in investment bound destinations. 
 
(5.)           PRIV=MEM+TRCOST 
Growth will also be expressed as a function of labour, capital and technology which will 
depend on country specific institutional framework regarding wages, loan acquisition and 
investment in domestic innovation as captured by the institutional variable (INST) and 
other factors such as country specific macroeconomic management (MEM) quality, the 
privatization process (PRIV) and foreign direct investment (FDI) which can have useful 
implication for growth in Africa. 
 
(6.)           GROWTH = PRIV +MEM+INST+FDI 
The Foreign investment inflow (FDI) equation can now be expanded to include three 
additional factors which include the privatization process (PRIV), macroeconomic 
management (MEM), institutions (INST) and two previous factors market potential 
(MARPOT) and Transaction cost as depicted by cost of transportation (TRCOST) with 
the last three shaping investor’s perception to a high degree. 
 
(7.)           FDI= PRIV+MEM+INST+MARPOT 
Three different models are utilized in the study. In an attempt to understand what drives 
countries to privatize the first model analyses the determinant of privatization here 
Privatization is expressed as a function of institutions and other list of variables which 
include FDI, openness, inflation, exchange rates, government expenditure spending, 
market potential, exports and transportation cost. 
 
PRIV f (INST, FDI, OPEN, INF, EXC, GOVEXP, MARPT, EXP and TRCOST) 
The second model examines the effect of the privatization process on growth other 
variables included as controls include FDI, openness, inflation, exchange rates, 
government expenditure spending, market potential, exports and transportation cost. 
 
GDP f (PRIV, INST, FDI, OPEN, INF, EXC, GOVEXP, MARPT, EXP and TRCOST) 
The third model examines the effect of the privatization process in attracting investment 
other variables included as controls include GDP, openness, inflation, exchange rates, 
government expenditure spending, market potential, exports and transportation cost. 
 
FDI f (PRIV, INST, GDP, OPEN, INF, EXC, GOVEXP, MARPT, EXP and TRCOST) 
The first model has three different specifications which are examined using the linear; the 
two stage least squares instrumental variable and general method of moment 
specifications as shown below in equations 8a to 8d. Equation 8 a shows the simple linear 
specification of the model estimated using OLS and linear mixed effect estimation 
technique. The control of the endogeneity of the institutional variable is conducted in 
equations 8b and 8c respectively and estimated using the two stage least squares 
instrumental variable technique. In equation 8 d the model is estimated using the GMM 
estimation technique. The reason for this is to depict that estimating the model 
specification without controlling for the presence of endogenous regressors could lead to 
biased results. 
             (8a.) ܲݎ݅ݒ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଶ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧     
 
            (8b.) ܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܱܲܮ௜,௧ + ߙଶ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧        
            (8c.) ܲݎ݅ݒ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଶ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧        
 
            (8d.) ܲݎ݅ݒ௜,௧ = (ߙ௢ − 1)ܲݎ݅ݒ௧ିଵ + ߙଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଶ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߳௜,௧        
 
The privatization effect on growth is also estimated, the model is also estimated using the 
above three techniques and the control for the endogeneity of the institutional variable is 
also conducted in equations 9b and 9 c respectively. 
       (9a.) ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܴܲܫ ௜ܸ ,௧ + ߙଶܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଷ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧ 
       (9b.) ܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܱܲܮ௜,௧ + ߙଶ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧          
       (9c.)ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܴܲܫ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߙଶܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଷ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧        
 
      (9d.) ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜,௧ = (ߙ௢ − 1)ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௧ିଵ + ߙଵܴܲܫ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߙଶܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଷ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߳௜,௧        
 
The effect of the privatization on foreign direct investment is also considered the model 
specifications are expressed below in equation 10a to 10 d. The correction of the 
institutional variable is also conducted in equation 10b and 10 c. The model is also 
estimated using GMM estimation technique in equation 10d. 
 
       (10a.) ܨܦܫ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܴܲܫ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߙଶܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଷ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧ 
 
              (10b.) ܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܱܲܮ௜,௧ + ߙଶ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧          
              (10c.) ܨܦܫ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܴܲܫ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߙଶܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଷ ௜ܺ,௧ + ݑ௜,௧        
 
              (10d.) ܨܦܫ௜,௧ = (ߙ௢ − 1)ܨܦܫ௧ିଵ + ߙଵܴܲܫ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߙଶܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߙଷ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߳௜,௧        
 
All explanatory variables are lagged to resolve issues of multi-co linearity and serial 
correlation although this was done for only one period. The variable year dummy is 
included to control for robustness in the estimation results while the country dummy 
results are not reported even though they are included in the regression. The control for 
the endogeneity of the institutional variable is based on past literature which suggests that 
institutions are endogenous Przewoski A. (2004). The use of GMM in addition to control 
for multiple endogenous variables, deals with issues of panel bias and fixed effects since 
the disturbance term ϵ୧,୲  consist of the fixed effects μ୧,୲  and the idiosyncratic shocks  v୧,୲ 
see Arrellano Bond (1998), Bond (1998), Doormik, Arellano, Bond (2002) and Roodman 
(2009).  Some other obvious advantages of the GMM estimation are that it controls for 
long run effects and the estimates are robust even in the presence of heteroscedastic 
errors. The lag of the dependent variable (α୭ − 1) is also added as an explanatory 
variable and the system GMM includes all explanatory variable and their lag values as 
instruments allowing us to overcome the problem of searching for a suitable instrument 
see Roodman (2009) for extensive explanation of the GMM estimator. 
 
 
2.1 Data and Sources 
 
In this section we describe all data used in the study and their sources. All data are 
obtained from the data market of Iceland unless otherwise stated. A panel of ten African 
countries are used in the study two from each of the five major regional blocs (i.e. 
Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Angola, Kenya, Uganda, Botswana and 
South Africa) for a period of 53 years (i.e. 1960 to 2012), Direct credit to the private 
sector the measure for privatization is the flow, of private credit to private sector business 
in constant US dollars, GDP per capita our measure of growth and foreign direct 
investment foreign direct investment (FDI) are used as dependent variables 
interchangeably. Other list of explanatory variables include Institutions (INST) which is  
 
    Table-2 Descriptive Statistics Used in the Study 
 
        Variable Observations        Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Direct Credit to the Private Sector  462 25.69 29.53 1.54 167.54 
Log of GDP per capita 505 0.31000 0.600000 0.160000 0.00003 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 155 8861 4464 26 16960 
Institutions (Paved Road Network)  386 1091653 2106332 4700 12000000 
Exports in Constant USD 459          28.37 14.72 3.34 89.62 
Transportation Cost 530 38.09 25.94 9.34 99.71 
Market Potential 530 27900000 29100000 524173 1700000000 
Openness  520 64.16 29.31 22.30 174.70 
Exchange Rate 514 108.34 315.93 0.000000025 2147.5 
Inflation 436 39.01 249.72 -8.42 4145.11 
Government Expenditure Spending                519 14.16    30.74 0.03 154.21 
Index of Economic Policy 436 3980000000    4860000000 -21600000000 4145 
 Note: Descriptive statistics is derived from author’s dataset obtained from data market of Iceland and WDI 
data of the World Bank. 
 
the length of paved road in Kilometers, exports which is total goods and services 
exported in constant USD, transaction cost of doing business is captured using average 
crude oil price which is a function of transportation cost, market potential depicts the 
domestic market attractiveness as a destination for finished products was captured using 
 
Table-3. List of Variables and Description 
Variables Sources Abbreviations  Description 
Direct Credit to the Private 
Sector 
Data Market of 
Iceland 
DCPS Credit granted to the private sector in 
constant USD. 
    Foreign Direct Investment  Data Market of 
Iceland 
FDI Aggregate inflow of investment over 
years in constant USD. 
    Gross Domestic Product Data Market of 
Iceland 
GDP/capita Total goods and services produced in 
countries in constant USD 
    Institutions  Data Market of 
Iceland 
INST The measure for institution was the 
length of paved roads in kilometers 
    Openness  Data Market of 
Iceland 
OPEN This is the ration of exports to imports 
    Inflation  Data Market of 
Iceland 
INF This is the percentage changes in 
prices of community overtime. 
Exchange Rate  Data Market of 
Iceland 
EXC This is the average local currency 
dollar exchange rate overtime. 
Market Potential  Data Market of 
Iceland 
MARPT Domestic attractiveness of the local 
market for both foreign and local 
producers measured using population 
density. 
Transportation Cost Data Market of 
Iceland 
TRCOST Cost of crude oil overtime was used to 
capture the cost of transportation 
which represents the transaction cost 
of trade. 
Exports  Data Market of 
Iceland 
EXP Aggregate goods and services 
exported overseas in constant USD. 
Government Expenditure  Data Market of 
Iceland 
GOVEXP Government expenditure spending is 
the aggregate spending on 
consumption and infrastructure over 
time. 
        Index of Economic Policy Authors Compilation POL 
 
Economic policy index constructed 
from the residual of inflation and 
openness on GDP (see Burnside and 
Dollar (2004)) 
     
Note: All data are obtained from Data Market of otherwise stated. The economic policy index is developed 
by authors. 
 
population density and four macroeconomic variables namely openness which is the ratio 
of exports to imports, government expenditure spending which captures country specific 
fiscal spending, inflation which depict the riskiness of the immediate business 
environment and reflects the quality of a country’s monetary policy and average local 
currency to dollar exchange rate. The table of descriptive statistics is presented above in 
Table 2. The variable description and sources are also explained in Table 3 above. 
 
 
2.2 Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
In this section we present the technical reasoning for the study and the results of the 
regressions. In studying the implication of the privatization reform process for Africa we 
rely on the conditions, that weak regulatory framework and poor monitoring of the 
privatization reform process is likely to hinder the possible gains that could accrue 
divesture from public firms by government. Allowing us to state that the states in 
Condition B is likely to be the possible states that the outcome of the privatization reform 
could have, for the payoff of government and firms in Africa. Our assertion is backed up 
by past literature that state that institutional weaknesses and poor oversight function of 
the regulatory agencies is likely to be responsible for the poor outcome of privatization 
reforms in Africa Stiglitz (2000) and Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and Robinson J. (2001). 
 
The results of all regressions are presented in Tables 4 to 6. The Hausman Tahylor test 
was run to determine if fixed or random effect were most suitable for our estimation and 
the null hypothesis, that estimating the 2SLS equations using fixed effects were suitable 
for the model specification, were accepted at P- values of 0.01, 0.03 and 0.02 
respectively, depicting that fixed effect estimation was more suitable due to the time 
varying nature of the data set. However we present the results of both the fixed effects 
and random effects estimation in our results.  
 The F-Tests for the OLS and LME regressions are high (149.5 and 108 respectively), 
depicting that the model captures significantly most factors that affect the dependent 
variable. The F-Test for instrumental validity were also quite high at 45.8, 78, and 104 
respectively for the privatization, growth and FDI regressions allowing us to state that our 
instrument policy is valid since we use only one instrument in each case our model is 
exactly identified. The first stage results also show that our instruments are relevant since 
the instrument policy had a significant effect on institutions these results are omitted for 
the sake of brevity. The Sargan-Hansen test for over identifying restriction also shows 
that our instruments are valid, while we also accept the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation for the system GMM results. The GMM results, the preferred method of 
estimation show that institutions have no effect on the privatization process in Africa 
which is consistent with past literature Stiglitz (2000) and Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and 
Robinson J. (2001) see Table 4 Column 5.  
 
Government spending the fiscal variable had a positive significant effect on privatization. 
Trade openness also had strong significant effect on privatization. The implication of this 
is that privatization was probably being driven by need to free up resources used in 
running and subsidizing inefficient public enterprises for infrastructural development to 
stimulate growth in the economy through healthy private sector competition. Openness 
was also having strong effect on privatization probably due to the liberalization of the 
economy, enshrining property rights and access to private ownership of firms. 
 
The result in Table 5 Column 5 also shows that privatization also had no effect on growth 
in Africa. Market potential had a negative effect on growth showing that markets in 
Africa were still probably not developed enough to drive growth domestically and 
cushion the African economy from external shocks. 
 
The result in Table 6 also shows that privatization was also not attracting FDI to Africa. 
The strongest factor attracting FDI to the continent was openness. Other factors that had 
significant effect on FDI inflow were government expenditure spending and exchange 
rates depicting once again the investors pay attention to country specific fiscal policy and 
the relative cheapness of transacting business in a country with devalued currency, which 
was probably attracting investments. Poor markets were also deterring FDI inflow while 
inflation also had a negative effect on investment inflow. 
 
 The set objectives of the study are realized, 
a.) Two macroeconomic variables, openness and the fiscal variable- government 
spending - were found to have strong significant effect on Privatization.  
b.)  Privatization was found not to exert any effect on growth in Africa. 
c.) Privatization was also found not to attract foreign direct investment to Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table -4 Factors That Promote the Privatization Process 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
LME 
(3) 
2SLS RE 
(4) 
2SLS FE 
(5) 
GMM 
VARIABLES Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization 
      
L.DCPS     1.02*** 
     (0.07) 
L2.DCPS     0.17** 
     (0.07) 
INST 8.09*** 8.09*** -6.56 6.20 2.07 
 (8.58) (8.58) (9.57) (7.52) (3.08) 
FDI -0.78 -0.78 0.28 -0.75 -0.09 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.09) 
INF  -0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
OPEN -0.15* -0.15* 0.19 -0.15 0.07** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.34) (0.09) (0.03) 
GOVEXP.  0.04 0.04 0.71*** 0.03 0.12*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03) 
MARPT  1.68 1.68  2.51 -13.53 
 (1.69) (1.69)  (3.91) (11.66) 
EXC -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.01 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.004) 
EXP  0.17 0.17 -0.72*** 0.10 -0.08* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.32) (0.04) 
TRCOST -0.17 -0.17 -0.10 -0.13 -0.04 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.13) (0.27) (0.05) 
Year Dummy No  No  Yes  No  No  
Observations 306 306 306 306 287 
R-squared 0.388     
Number of id   10 10 10 
Note: All standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The results above 
show that privatization is undertaken by the need to stop subsidizing publicly owned firms 
and develop private ownership of businesses to stimulate competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-5 The Effect of Privatization on Growth in Africa 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
LME 
(3) 
2SLS RE 
(4) 
2SLS FE 
(5) 
GMM 
VARIABLES GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP 
      
L.GDPPERCAP     1.34*** 
     (0.06) 
L2.GDPPERCAP     0.37*** 
     (0.05) 
DCPS -3.75 -3.75 3.50 3.40 0.01 
 (4.94) (4.94) (2.20) (3.28) (1.92) 
INST 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
FDI -7.90** -7.90** 3.90 -3.38 8.82 
 (3.89) (3.89) (3.62) (6.35) (5.81) 
INF -1.96*** -1.96*** -6.63 -1.89** 0.01 
 (5.51) (5.51) (3.95) (7.55) (0.01) 
OPEN 1.26* 1.26* -3.11 1.94* -3.23 
 (7.11) (7.11) (3.18) (1.13) (2.30) 
GOVEXP -2.39*** -2.39*** -3.81** -3.03*** -1.04 
 (4.21) (4.21) (1.55) (8.12) (2.17) 
MARPT -3.57*** -3.57*** -3.21*** -3.24*** -3.11** 
 (1.35) (1.35) (0.87) (3.53) (7.74) 
EXC 8.33* 8.33* -4.69 -7.91 -0.01 
 (4.48) (4.48) (8.68) (1.41) (0.03) 
EXP 6.68*** 6.68*** 2.24 2.50 1.59 
 (1.35) (1.35) (1.62) (3.73) (2.92) 
TRCOST 2.71 2.71 1.45 3.21 -2.83 
 (2.35) (2.35) (1.11) (3.15) (3.22) 
Year Dummy No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 306 306 306 306 292 
R-squared 0.846     
Number of id   10 10 10 
Note: All standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results above show 
that poor domestic markets were still an issue for many African countries and that this had 
negative implications for growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-6 The Effect of Privatization on FDI in Africa 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
LME 
(4) 
2SLS RE 
(5) 
2SLS FE 
(6) 
GMM 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
      
L.FDI     0.27*** 
     (0.06) 
L2.FDI     0.09 
     (0.06) 
LNGDPPERCAP -199.6** -199.6** 0.01 0.01 368.98* 
 (98.18) (98.18) (0.02) (0.02) (190.45) 
DCPS -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
INST 2.29* 2.29* 4.04 -7.44 -3.00 
 (1.30) (1.30) (6.37) (5.06) (2.11) 
INF -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
OPEN 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.07* 0.04*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
GOVEXP -0.007 -0.007 0.02 -0.008 0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
MARPT -0.01 -0.01 4.56 0.99*** -31.65*** 
 (0.41) (0.41) (3.99) (0.28) (7.53) 
EXCH 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002* 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
EXP 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.06* 0.08*** -0.03 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
TRCOST 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Year Dummy No  No  No  Yes Yes 
Observations 306 306 306 306 285 
R-squared 0.365     
Number of id   10 10 10 
Note: All standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results show that 
investors are probably more confident to invest in countries with adequate property rights and less 
restriction for trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 Implication of Privatization for Developing and Emerging 
Economies. 
 
The implication of privatization for developing and emerging countries particularly those 
in Africa will be two fold.  Considering results for the study for Africa, the first outcome 
will be that privatizing public enterprises will free up resources for further development 
purposes, allowing government to embark on infrastructural development that could 
create enabling environment for trade through the reduction of transaction cost and 
creating more accessibility to natural resource deposits from ports. 
 
Secondly the privatization process will make many developing countries competitive 
since privatization will improve property rights laws and stimulate competition in the 
private sector. It will also allow foreign firms to take advantage of the low cost of labor 
and closeness to natural resources and destination markets for their goods as in the case 
of China, by siting production plants in well deserving developing countries with such 
incentives. 
Based on the aforementioned results we can now draw the following implications for the 
privatization process as follows; 
a.) That the gains from privatization are not likely to be immediate for many 
emerging and developing countries particularly those in Africa. 
b.) Privatization is likely to free up resources to enable the development of 
infrastructure and creating enabling environment for trade. Therefore one of the 
roles of the privatization process is to make developing countries more attractive 
for foreign investors. 
c.) Privatization is likely to stimulate competition and improve private participation 
in commerce through the development of private ownership of firms and 
encouraging entrepreneurship. 
d.) A well monitored privatization process will be a win-win situation for both 
investors and government since it could lead to the maximization of both parties 
welfare. 
e.) Privatization is likely to drive growth by developing domestic markets through 
increase in local participation in trade and commerce on the long run so as to 
insulate many developing African countries from global shocks. 
 
f.) Finally the gains of privatization can be seriously affected by corruption Stiglitz 
(2000) and predative investments Levy (1989) since foreign firms with enormous 
capital strength could outlast domestic firms in price wars, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of predation. This threat can be overcome by creating efficient market 
systems in developing countries to stem imperfect (asymmetric) information. 
 
 
3.1 Incorporating Growth Strategies in Developing Economies 
Privatization Process 
 
 
It is clear that the gains of the privatization reform process are not likely to be immediate. 
The question we will like to ask is, what growth strategies should be implemented in 
conjunction with the privatization process to achieve growth? In trying to answer the 
question we will revisit our methodology review analysis of the simple privatization 
normal form game, where we state that both the government (owner of public firms) and 
potential investors will only seek their own personal interests. Welfare maximization 
therefore will be the end choice for both government (in this case welfare will be growth) 
and potential investors (in this case welfare will be profits). 
 
Privatization is not likely to yield any useful results without some monitoring by 
government since investors will engage in predative activities that could harm the overall 
process and could have dire consequences for domestic firms. We list five potential 
strategies that should be implemented with the privatization process to drive growth, they 
include: 
a.) Protection of domestic firms from predative concerns that can arise with the arrival 
of foreign firms, with enormous capital in many emerging countries, which could 
lead to price wars, should be ensured. Since the aim of lowering prices initially by 
predative investors, is to drive out other firms from the market and later increase 
such prices. 
b.) Openness to trade particularly in sectors that are fairly established in domestic 
strength should be encouraged while developing sectors should be protected from 
hostile foreign competition. 
c.) Technological cooperation between local and foreign firms should be encouraged to 
improve the services of domestic firms with the arrival of more competitive foreign 
firms. 
d.) More transparency should be encouraged in the privatization process to reduce 
corruption and shore up investor’s perception for investment in emerging African 
countries. 
e.) Fiscal discipline should be developed since accountability in budgetary 
implementation can affect investor’s perception in these countries. 
 
Two important macroeconomic factors openness and fiscal discipline should be utilized 
side by side by government with the privatization process to stimulate growth in a 
strategic manner which we expressed below as 
 
                                (11.) GROWTH = PRIV*MEM +INST+FDI+X 
The protection of domestic firms from hostile competition and the promoting of 
cooperation between local and foreign firms could be instituted as conditionality for 
allowing the inflow of foreign direct investment particularly to attractive sectors in the 
economy, allowing government to use foreign invest in a strategic manner during the 
privatization process to make privatization drive growth which is expressed as  
 
                            (12.) GROWTH = PRIV*FDI+MEM+INST+X 
Finally improving the transparency of the privatization process will be a function of 
institutional factors that govern the bidding and privatization process. Transparent 
privatization processes can affect the overall privatization process by ensuring that firms 
go to well deserved private interests who have the capability to manage them allowing us 
to express this below again as  
 
                          (13.) GROWTH = PRIV*INST+MEM+FDI+X 
Where PRIV, INST, MEM AND X represents privatization, institutions, macroeconomic 
management and all other exogenous variables that can affect growth respectively. 
 
4.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
The study reviews the relationship between privatization and macroeconomic 
management in some selected countries in Africa. The questions asked are; if macro-
economic management is related to the privatization process in Africa? It was found that 
two macro-economic factors property rights promotion (trade openness) and fiscal 
concerns (government expenditure spending) were probably significant in promoting 
privatization in Africa. 
 
The question; if privatization was promoting growth was also asked, it was found that 
privatization gains were probably not likely to be immediate and that privatization was 
not promoting growth in Africa. Implementing privatization in a strategic manner n an 
atmosphere where government monitors the programme through protection of domestic 
firms, encouraging cooperation between foreign and local firms to stimulate 
technological transfer and transparency in the privatization process could make 
privatization have useful effects for growth. 
 
The effect of privatization on foreign investment inflow was also investigated it was also 
found that the privatization process in Africa was not attracting foreign investment 
sufficiently. Institutions could have stronger implications for investment inflow, since 
issues of corruption and infrastructural challenges are still quite prevalent in many parts 
of Africa. 
 
Normal form games provided insights into the maximization concerns for both the private 
investor and public welfare, it was discovered that private sector profits and national 
growth (i.e. the welfare or interest of the private investors and governments) could be 
maximized in a sufficient manner in an atmosphere where there exist efficient and 
capable monitoring of the privatization process making good macroeconomic 
management to be useful for the overall privatization process.  
 
Our findings are supported by a host of literature such as Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and 
Robinson J. (2001) who argues extensively that institutional weaknesses had strong 
consequences for growth in Africa, Stiglitz (2000) who states that implementing 
economic reforms without institutional reform could be catastrophic for developing 
countries and finally the paper by Levy (1989) who argue that predatory investment will 
lead to price wars, where firms with stronger capital outdo weaker firms, only later to 
increase prices and weaken competition during the divesture process, making predatory 
investment to have negative effects for privatization in countries. 
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